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NOTES AND COMMENTS
as a matter of law that the refusal was not an unfair practice,25 the
Board is entitled to the benefit of a presumption that its experienced
judgment is correct.
26
Whatever be the merits of the very close question of due process,
the Supreme Court's opinion in the Stowe case is in line with its liberal
policy in construing the National Labor Relations Act. The holding
is restricted to circumstances where two conditions concurrently exist:
(1) physical necessity for holding the meeting, if at all, in the employ-
er's hall; (2) use of the hall, with the employer's assent, by the public
for other purposes. Thus understood, the decision is of limited sig-
nificance. It remains for the future to disclose where the court will
draw the ultimate line in balancing the conflicting claims of employers





The power of municipalities to legislate on specifically enumerated
subjects is usually supplemented by a general delegation of authority
to pass ordinances for the general welfare of the city. In North Caro-
lina this general enabling act is N. C. GEN. STAT. §160-52 (1943), which
provides that "The board of commissioners shall have power to make
ordinances, rules and regulations for the better government of the town,
not inconsistent with this chapter and the law of the land, as they may
deem necessary."
"[Police ordinances and regulations] must not be inconsistent with
the general laws of the state, including the common law, equity and
public policy."'  This principle is frequently relied upon in litigation
involving the validity of a local regulation, and many ordinances are
attacked and overthrown as in conflict with the general law. Therefore,
it is important to attorneys and to local legislative bodies to know what
constitutes such an inconsistency as is contemplated by the statute. How
"' Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U. S. 501, 509 (1946) ("Ownership does not always
mean absolute dominion. The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his
property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights become circum-
scribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it.") ; National
Labor Relations Board v. Cities Service Oil Co., 122 F. 2d 149 (C. C. A. 2nd
1941) ("It is not every interference with properVy rights that is within the Fifth
Amendment .... Inconvenience, and even some dislocation of property rights,
may be necessary in order to safeguard the right to collective bargaining."). This
statement was cited and quoted in the Republic case, 324 U. S. 793,. 803 (1945).
"E.g., Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828 (1943), enforcement granted.
142 F. 2d 1009 (C. C. A. 5th 1944).
'3 McQun.LiN, MU NICiPAL CoRPORtATIoNs §953 (2nd ed. 1939).
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may municipal regulations best be drawn to avoid a conflict? When will
the court look for some state law or policy on the same subject in order
to invalidate an ordinance and when will it endeavor to find them
consistent ?
As will be seen, some ordinances are so worded that they cannot be
reconciled with the state law. In that case the latter must, of course,
prevail. 2 But when the state and local regulations merely overlap to a
certain extent the question is as to their comparative effectiveness. This
depends on whether the matter to be regulated is one of more particular
interest to the people as members of municipalities or as citizens of the
state. Does it involve acts more injurious and more apt to occur in
congested areas than elsewhere? Do local differences make uniform
legislation impractical, or would varying degrees of regulation from
place to place impede enforcement? These factors are seldom discussed
in the written opinions, the courts talking only in terms of conflict or
of the authority of the municipality. However, the courts should and
apparently do in most cases give some consideration to the purpose
behind the general law. Then if it is thought that some degree of
municipal control will aid in the accomplishment of that purpose, the
ordinance will be upheld whenever possible; if not, it is apt to be found
inconsistent, or the state said to have "preempted" the field. Only on
this basis can the decisions be reconciled.
DIRECT CONFLICT BETWEEN STATUTE AND ORDINANCE
It is settled everywhere that an ordinance cannot "prohibit an act
which the state permits, or permit an act which the state prohibits."8
In the words of the North Carolina Supreme Court, a town "cannot by
ordinance make an act illegal which is legal under our statutes."'4 As
for permitting what the state prohibits, our court has held that a city
might not pay a debt incurred "in aid of the rebellion," the state having
since declared all such debts to be unlawful and expressly forbidden
that they be paid." 5  Also, where cities are allowed by statute to tax
'2 id. §683 n. 68.
'See Schneiderman v. Sesanstein, 121 Ohio St. 80, 86, 167 N. E. 158, 160
(1929) ; Village of Struthers v. Sokol, 108 Ohio St. 263, 268, 140 N. E. 519, 521
(1923).
Prohibiting what state permits. Shelton v. City of Shelton, 111 Conn. 433,
150 AtI. 811 (1930); National Amusement Co. v. Johnson, 270 Mich. 613, 259
N. W. 342 (1935) ; Collins v. Hatch, 18 Ohio 523, 51 Am. Dec. 465 (1849) ; Craig
v. Gallatin; 168 Tenn. 413, 79 S. W. 2d 553 (1935); Brewer v. State, 113 Tex.
Crim. 522, 24 S. W. 2d 409 (1930).
Permitting what state prohibits. I re Ridenbaugh, 5 Idaho 371, 49 Pac. 12
(1897) ; Commonwealth v. Surridge, 265 Mass. 425, 164 N. E. 480 (1929) ; Armi.
tage v. Camden, 5 N. J. Misc. Rep. 129, 135 Atl. 661 (1927) ; Zucarro v. State,
82 Tex. Cr. Rep. 1, 197 S. W. 982 (1917).
' State v. Eubanks, 154 N. C. 628, 632, 70 S. E. 466, 467 (1911).
'Weith v. City of Wilmington, 68 N. C. 24 (1873).
(Vol. 27
NOTES AND COMMENTS
motion picture theatres on a population basis, a city may not levy a
higher tax than is permitted for cities in its population bracket, accord-
ing to the official census.6 A more recent example is Eldridge v. Man-
gum. 7 There a statute required the vote of three-fourths of a municipal
legislative body in order to amend a zoning plan over the protest of the
property owners involved. An ordinance requiring only a majority vote
of the city's three commissioners in such a situation was held void.
IDENTICAL PROVISIONS IN STATUTE AND ORDINANCE
It is well settled in North Carolina that an ordinance which dupli-
cates a statute cannot stand. Thus where an ordinance provides that
its violators shall be arrested, the provision for arrest, at least, is void,
since the power to arrest is given by statute which makes the violation
of any town ordinance a misdemeanor.8 However, if the remainder of
the ordinance is not a duplication of or repugnant to the state law it
may be upheld as a distinct and independent part of the ordinance.9
And it has been held that one cannot be convicted for violating an
ordinance which prohibits gambling in almost the identical words of a
statute declaring the same acts to be a mislemeanor.'0  It was said that
the ordinance conferred no jurisdiction of the offense since it was in
"conflict" with the general law. It made no difference that the ordi-
nance was passed first and had been valid until duplicated and super-
seded by the statute."
STATUTE AND ORDINANCE PUNISHING THE SAME ACT
Even when the language of statute and ordinance are not identical,
it is sometimes said that under a general grant of power a city may
not penalize an act punishable by statute,'2 but there is considerable
authority to the contrary.' 3 In North Carolina "it is settled that a town
ordinance that undertakes to make that which constitutes a criminal
offense under the general law of the state an offense against the town,
punishable by fine or otherwise, is inoperative and void."'14 California
takes the same view,' 5 subject to the careful distinction that "We only
' State v. Prevo, 178 N. C. 740, 101 S. E. 370 (1919).
7216 N. C. 532, 5 S. E. 2d 721 (1939).
' State v. Earnhardt, 107 N. C. 789, 12 S. E. 426 (1890). The court points
out that a fine imposed by a by-law is only a debt arising ex contract6, so to arrest
one merely to collect the fine would be imprisonment for debt prohibited by N. C.
CoNsT. Art. I, §16.
'Ibid.; cf. Chapman v. Selover, 172 App. Div. 858, 159 N. Y. Supp. 632 (4th
Dep't. 1916), rev'd, 225 N. Y. 417, 122 N. E. 206 (1919).
1" State v. McCoy, 116 N. C. 1059, 21 S. E. 690 (1895) ; Contra: City of
Seattle v. MacDonald, 47 Wash. 298, 91 Pac. 952 (1907).
"'See 2 McQuILLIN, op. cit. supra §683 n. 75.
122 DILLON, MUNIcIPAL CORPORATIONS §632; 3 McQuiLLn, op. cit. supra
§924.1' See Note, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 63 et eq.
"' State v. Keith. 94 N. C. 933, 934 (1886) (resisting an officer).
" See Ex parte Daniels, 183 Cal. 636, 645, 192 Pac. 442, 447 (1929).
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hold that there is a conflict where the ordinance and the general law
punish. precisely the same acts. We do not wish to be understood as
holding that the sections of the ordinance which make criminal other
acts not punishable under the general law are void because the legis-
lature has seen fit to legislate upon the subject."'10 The Supreme Court
of Washington, however, while recognizing an adverse weight of author-
ity, has held. that under a general grant of authority a city may enact
ordinances for the ,punishment of offenses already made punishable by
state laws.17.
The reasons for not allowing an ordinance and a statute punishing
the same 9,A.ense to stand together are brought out in the opinion in
Town of Washington v. Hammond.'8  The defendant had been con-
victed for violating an ordinance which provided for a fine of not more
than twenty dollars, or imprisonment for not more than one month for
injuring public property. Damaging public buildings was also made a
misdemeanor by statute. In reversing the conviction the court said that
since the superior courts have no original jurisdiction when punishments
are limited .as in the ordinance, to allow it to stand would be to strip
those courts of. their original jurisdiction of the offense.19 As an alter-
native objection is was said that the offender could not be tried and
punished under both laws. But in State v. Taylor2 0 the defendant was
tried by both municipal and state courts for the same act. He was
indicted for assault and pleaded a former conviction under an ordinance
against disturbing the peace by fighting. The court said "It is well
settled that a town ordinance cannot make criminal or prescribe a pun-
ishment for acts which are indictable at common law or by statute,"
21
but held the ordinance valid and the former conviction no bar to prose-
cution by the state. The court found no double jeopardy in this
situation on the theory that the two actions were for different offenses,
different in that one might fight in such a way as to violate the ordinance
without being guilty of an assault. This illustrates the length to which
the court will go to uphold an ordinance which is thought to be well
adapted to carry out the legislative policy of the state. This can be
" In re Sic, 73 Cal. 142, 149, 14 Pac. 405, 408 (1887).
"City of Seattle v..MacDonald, 47 Wash. 298, 91 Pac. 952 (1907).
1876 N. C. 33 (1877).
19 Texas allows municipal punishment of state offenses provided only that the
punishment be identical with that prescribed by the statute. See Neuvar v. State,
72 Tex. Crim. App. 410, 163 S. W. 58, 60 (1914). Kentucky only requires that
the minimtrm punishment be the same. Burden v. Hendrix, 205 Ky. 167, 265 S. W.
493 (1924). In neither state may one be punished under both statute and ordi-
nance. 3 McQuinLTi, op. cit. supra §§929, 932.
20 133 N. C. 755, 46 S. E. 5 (1903) ; cf. State v. Stevens, 114 N. C. 873, 19
S. E. 861 (1894) ; State v. Tucker, 137 Wash. 162, 242 Pac. 363 (1926) ; Mahew
v. Eugene, 56 Ore. 102, 104 Pac. 727 (1909).
"' State v. Taylor, supra note 20 at 758, 46 S. E. at 6.
[Vol. 27
NOTES AND COMMENTS
done only if the words of the ordinance do not render it necessarily co-
extensive with the general law on the subject.
Indeed, though the indiscriminate use of the words "act" and
"offense" in the opinions often tends to cloud the issue, the majority
of jurisdictions will allow state and local prosecutions for the same act.
2 2
The double jeopardy argument is sometimes met by holding that recov-
ery of a penalty by the city is a civil action for debt and not a criminal
prosecution.23 More frequently, however, it is on the ground that the
prohibited act constitutes two distinct offenses against different governing
bodies.
24
O1INANCES SUPPLEMENTING STATUTORY REGULATIONS
It is usually said that an ordinance may supplement a statute,25 and
a municipal government may make "new, further, and more definite
regulations" 26 in addition to those provided for by the general law.
2 7
Mr. Justice Connor in the Taylor case quoted Chief Justice Bleckley,
formerly of the Georgia Supreme Court, as follows: "Many transactions
which are made penal by the general law of the state may at the same time
afford material for a proper police ordinance. The state may deal only
with the central element of the transaction, which is fringed all around
with adjuncts that ought to be prohibited by ordinances as highly mis-
chievous to the quiet of municipal society." 28  The reason for allowing
additional local legislation in most fields is that many acts are more
injurious and more apt to occur in congested areas than throughout the
state as a whole, and so are more efficiently regulated by municipalities.
2 9
In order to meet the more acute needs of city life, ordinances have been
upheld which prescribe higher standards than a statute requires,30 or
fix a more severe penalty, 31 or both.3 2  In some jurisdictions a general
" 3 McQuiLLiN, op. cit. mpra §934.
"Levy v. State, 6 Ind. 281 (1855); cf. State v. Earnhardt, 107 N. C. 789,
12 S. E. 426 (1890).
24 See generally on this subject Kneier, Prosecution Under State Law and
Municipal Ordinance as Double Jeopardy, 16 CoRN. L. Q. 201 (1931) ; 2 DILLON,
op. cit. supra §633.
213 McQuILLIN, op. cit. supra §924, n. 25.262 DILLON, op. cit. supra §632.
2 Standard Chemical Oil Co. v. Troy, 201 Ala. 89, 77 So. 383 (1917) (privi-
lege tax) ; Dorsa v. Board of Supervisors of Santa Clara County, 23 Cal. App.
2d 217, 72 Pac. 2d 912 (1937) (hours for retailing meat); Lamar & Smith v.
Stroud, 5 S. W. 2d 824 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) (street crossings); Brittingham
& Hixon Lumber Co. v. Sparta, 157 Wis. 345, 147 N. W. 635 (1914) (weighing
coal).
28 McRea v. The Mayor, 59 Ga. 168, 170, 27 Am. Rep. 390 (1877),
263 McQuLLIN, op. cit. supra §924, n. 20; Town of Neola v. Reichart, 131
Iowa 492, 498, 109 N. W. 5, 7 (1906)."6 Ex parte Yong Shin, 98 Cal. 681, 33 Pac. 799 (1893) ; Spitler v. Town of
Munster, 214 Ind. 75, 14 N. E. 2d 579 (1935); Olson v. City of Platteville, 213
Wis. 344, 251 N. W. 245 (1933)."1 See Polinsky v. People, 73 N. Y. 65, 71 (1878).
62 Kansas City v. Henre, 96 Kan. 794, 153 Pac. 548 (1915).
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grant of power is even held to be sufficient authority to permit cities
to prohibit entirely within their borders acts and occupations which are
regulated or licensed by the state.33 North Carolina will not go this
far.34 However, North Carolina towns may prohibit lesser degrees of
offenses punished by the state, such as acts of disorderly conduct which
from the evidence do not amount to an indictable assault" or nuisance. 0
Also the city and state may act upon different persons in order to
achieve the same end. Thus an ordinance forbidding an unmarried
minor to enter a barroom has been held valid as properly supplementing
a state law which prohibited the sale of intoxicants to such minor.
3 7
ORDINANCES PURPORTING TO OPERATE IN A FIELD PREEMPTED
BY THE STATE
Not all ordinances which attempt to supplement the state law are
upheld. If the court feels that a given field will be better regulated if
left in the exclusive control of the state, an ordinance on the subject
will be held void, though it may be less extensive than or go beyond
existing statutory regulation. Before the days of prohibition the sale
of liquor was considered to be such a field in North Carolina. In State
v. Langstonas the court considered an ordinance forbidding any person,
"having license," to sell spiritous liquors on the Sabbath, and a statute
making it a misdemeanor to sell intoxicating liquors on Sunday. The
ordinance was held to be beyond the authority conferred by a general
grant of power to make by-laws. "This statute, more comprehensive
in its scope than the ordinance, embracing as well those who have not
as those who have, license to sell, ... must supersede the latter."3 9
In State v. Dannenberg0 it was the ordinance which had the broader
scope. It prohibited the sale of malt liquors containing one-half of one
per cent alcohol or more; the state prohibited the sale of all intoxicating
liquors in the same county. The defendant was convicted under the
ordinance for selling a malt drink containing over one-half of one per
cent of alcohol, but admitted not to be intoxicating. This ordinance
was held void and the judgment reversed. In answer to the contention
" Mitchell v. City of Birmingham, 222 Ala. 389, 133 So. 13 (1931) (fortune
telling) ; Elsner Bros. v. Hawkins, 113 Va. 47, 73 S. E. 479 (1912) (sale of
deadly weapons in pawn shops); Fox v. City of Racine, 225 Wis. 542, 275 N. W.
513 (1937) (walkathons).
.' State v. Brittain, 89 N. C. 574 (1883) : accord, National Amusement Co. v.
Johnson, 270 Mich. 613, 259 N. W. 342 (1935).
as State v. Taylor, 133 N. C. 755, 46 S. E. 5 (1903).
So State v. Sherrard, 117 N. C. 717, 23 S. E. 157 (1895).
"T State v. Austin, 114 N. C. 855, 19 S. E. 919 (1894).
3888 N. C. 692 (1883).
"Id. at 693. It can hardly be imagined that by prohibiting sales by one "hav-
ing license" it was intended to authorize sales without a license. Therefore, the
ordinance was probably meant to be equally as comprehensive as the statute.
"0 150 N. C. 799, 63 S. E. 946 (1909).
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of the attorney-general that this drink fell within a "twilight zone" out-
side the statutory prohibition the court said "We are of opinion that
the entire zone has been preempted by the statutes of the state and that
there is no territory open to entry. '41 California has also applied this
"preempting the field" doctrine. In a case very similar on its facts-
the ordinance was aimed at liquor with one-third of one per cent alcohol
content; the statutory standard was one-half-the court pointed out the
difficulty of enforcing liquor prohibition laws if liability is made to de-
pend on whether a particular liquor is intoxicating. Therefore it. was
thought that the state might sometime see fit to prohibit beverages which
were near-intoxicants and so intended to occupy that entire domain of
prohibitory legislation.
42
It is sometimes said that whether the state intends to occupy an
entire field depends on whether the matter legislated upon is essentially
criminal in its nature or merely regulatory, and if the latter it is subject
to additional local regulation.43 North Carolina, apparently, makes no
such distinction. Thus, where a statute requires one approaching any
intersection in an automobile to reduce his speed to not more than ten
miles per hour-not an "essentially criminal" matter-a city cannot
require him to stop altogether at certain named intersections.4 4 A better
explanation would seem to be that the state is held to have preempted a
field in which local regulation might tend to impede enforcement of a
related state law.
ORDINANCES CONFLICTING WITH A COMMON RIGHT OR POLICY
When a particular ordinance is thought to be improper or ill-advised
and there is no statute on the same subject, it may be attacked and in-
validated as in conflict with the common law,45 or as contravening a
common right,46 or as inconsistent with the state legislative policy.4 7
Thus in North Carolina it has been held that under the general grant of
authority of N. C. GEN. STAT. §160-52 (1943) a city could not legally
pass an ordinance forbidding an owner to remain in his barroom be-
tween ten o'clock P.M. and four o'clock A.M.', since it contravened the
"4 Id. at 802, 63 S. E. at 948.
"2 Ex parte Simmons, 71 Cal. App. 522, 235 Pac. 1029 (1925). This case is
an example of the interesting and apparently unique practice in California of
refusing to discharge a petitioner in habeas corpus, notwithstanding the invalidity
of the ordinance under which conviction was had, if the complaint, purporting to
charge a violation of the void ordinance, in fact charges an offense under the
state law.
2 DiU.ox, op. cit. supra §632; 15 CALiF. L. Ray. 345 (1926).
* State v. Stallings, 189 N. C. 104, 126 S. E. 187 (1924).
' See State v. Black, 150 N. C. 866, 867, 64 S. E. 778 (1909).
"2 DiLLox, op. cit. supra §§596, 597. Mr. Dillon leaves the point in some
doubt by saying "An ordinance cannot legally be made which contravenes a com-
mon right .... But there is, however, no common right to do that which, by a
valid law or ordinance is prohibited."
""2 id. §§601, 602; 2 MCQUILLIN, op. cit.. supra §685.
1949]
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common right of everyone to remain in his own house, whether dwelling
or place of business.48  In State v. Darnell4" the policy argument was
used to invalidate an ordinance making it unlawful for Negroes to occupy
houses on streets dominantly white and vice versa. The court drew
an analogy to the "Irish Pale" and the "Russian Ghettoes," each result-
ing in the exodus of an oppressed people, and indulged in the far-fetched
reasoning that since this ordinance would tend to have the same effect
it was contrary to North Carolina policy as embodied in an old law re-
quiring those who transported Negroes from the state to pay a license
fee. It is obvious that if the court had wished to uphold the ordinance
it could have gotten a truer picture of the North Carolina legislative
policy from public school and public vehicle segregation laws.
That infringement upon a common right is more a tool used to over-
throw undesirable local regulations than an insurmountable obstacle to
their validity appears from the decisions which hold ordinances valid
without discussing this possible objection.50 Many such decisions would
pass unnoticed except for a dissenting opinion which relies on the com-
mon right argument. For example, a zoning ordinance prohibiting a
filling station within 150 feet of the graded school has been upheld, not-
withstanding a dissenting opinion to the effect that it conflicted with
the principle that private property should not be taken for public pur-
poses without adequate compensation, "a principle so grounded in natural
equity it has never been denied to be part of the law of North Caro-
lina." 51 - In State v. Aulstin5 2 an ordinance excluding minors from bar-
rooms was held valid and not inconsistent with the "law of the land,"
characterized as the statutory and common law of the state. Yet Mr.
Justice Avery, dissenting, contended that such ordinance was incon-
sistent with the common law since it abridged an infant's common law
right of unrestrained locomotion.
ORDINANCES EXCEEDING THE AUTHORITY OF THE MUNICIPALITY
The court sometimes preserves exclusive control of a subject in the
state by invalidating ordinances on the basis of a want of authority to
pass them in the local legislative body. This means may be adopted in
preference to straining to find an inconsistency with the general law."3
48 State v. Thomas, 118 N. C. 1221, 24 S. E. 535 (1896) ; accord, State v. Ray,
131 N. C. 814, 42 S. E. 960 (1902).
49 166 N. C. 300, 81 S. E. 338 (1914). Contra: Tyler v. Harmon, 158 La. 439,
104 So. 200 (1925).
" Lawrence v. Nissen, 173 N. C. 359, 91 S. E. 1036 (1917) (location of a
hospital) ; State v. Vanhook, 182 N. C. 831, 109 S. E. 65 (1921) (regulating dance
halls).
51See Mr. Justice Clarkson, dissenting in Town of Ahoskie v. Moye, 200 N. C.
11, 15, 156 S. E. 130, 132 (1930).
02114 N. C. 855, 19 S. E. 919 (1894).
" State v. Gulledge, 208 N. C. 204, 179 S. E. 883 (1935).
[Vol. 27
NOTES AND COMMENTS
To support such a decision the court may rely upon Mr. Dillon's classi-
fication of the powers of a municipal corporation as only those expressly
granted, fairly implied, or essential to the declared purposes of the cor-
poration.5 4 In these cases N. C. GEN. STAT. §160-52 (1943) is either
ignored 55 or declared not to confer the requisite authority,56 in the ab-
sence of an express grant. In other cases where it is sought to uphold
the ordinance, however, the enabling act may itself be considered an
express grant of authority to exercise the police power of the state.
57
It has been seen that the court adopts various arguments when it is
sought to overthrow a particular ordinance. However, when the local
legislation is thought to be well adapted to the accomplishment of a
desirable end, the same arguments will not be allowed to prevail against
its validity. An example is State v. Wilson.55  The ordinance in that
case prohibited any person from obstructing any water-way so that the
water should accumulate in any street of the city, even if the obstruction
be placed on the party's own property. The possibilities for the "com-
mon right" argument are apparent. Defendant, charged with a violation,
contended that the ordinance was void as creating an offense-public
nuisance-already punishable by the general laws of the state, relying
on Washington v. Hammond and State v. Langston. Indeed the war-
rant as originally drawn had expressly referred to the condition pro-
duced by defendant's act as a "nuisance." However, the Supreme Court
found the ordinance valid and within the legislative power of the city.
The court considered the purpose of the ordinance, to prevent nuisances
by going beyond and enlarging the protection ordinarily afforded by the
general law, consistent and complementary. On the other hand, not
even an express grant of power to makeregulations on a particular sub-
ject will save an ordinance if the court feels it would be a poor policy
to enlarge on the statutory requirements in that field. 9
The key to the problem of the validity of a particular municipal
regulation in North Carolina is the attitude which the Supreme Court
has taken toward other ordinances in the same field.
Zoning. This is a field apparently thought to be well suited to
municipal control. Zoning ordinances are frequently attacked as un-
reasonable, arbitrary, or discriminatory, 60 but the possibility of a conflict
" Id. at 207, 179 S. E. at 885; State v. Darnell, 166 N. C. 300, 301, 81 S. E.
338 (1914). The cited section is 1 DILLON, op. cit. supra §237.
State v. Ray, 131 N. C. 814, 42 S. E. 960 (1902).
State v. Clay, 118 N. C. 1234, 24 S. E. 492 (1896); State v. Thomas, 118
N. C. 1221, 24 S. E. 535 (1896).
"See 131 N. C. 814, 819, 42 S. E. 960, 961 (1902).
B106 N. C. 718, 11 S. E. 254 (1890).
State v. Eubanks, 154 N. C. 628, 70 S. E. 466 (1911).
o Bizzell v. Board of Aldermen of the City of Goldsboro, 192 N. C. 348, 135
S. E. 50 (1926) ; State v. Tenant, 110 N. C. 609, 14 S. E. 387 (1892).
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with the general law is rarely considered.0 1
Disorderly conduct. North Carolina is definitely committed to the
view that acts of disorderly conduct are a proper subject for local regu-
lation, though the same acts, if repeated, or in a greater degree, or in a
different place might amount to an indictable assault or nuisance under
the general law.62 Even an ordinance expressly declaring the prohibited
acts to be a nuisance has been upheld, nuisance at common law being
disinguished as necessarily involving a public place. The question of
conflict was not argued.
63
Sunday observance.64 Ordinances restricting hours of business gen-
erally are not condoned.P However, Sunday observance is apparently
considered a proper subject for municipal regulation in conjunction with
state action, since the ordinance renders the state policy againist pur-
suing ordinary business callings on Sunday more efficient. 60 An ordi-
nance considered in State v. Medlin67 prohibited the keeping open of
any shop or store on Sunday except drug stores. The defendant con-
tended that it was invalid on the ground that Rev. 2836, forbidding work
in ordinary callings on Sunday, had preempted the field. In order to
uphold the ordinance the court looked to decisions construing the statute
as confined in its operation to "manual, visible, or noisy labor" and
found neither conflict nor duplication. The court pointed out that pub-
lic sentiment on the matter varies in different localities. Therefore,
power to make such local regulations is wisely vested in the towns by
N. C. GEN. STAT. §160-52 (1943) which takes notice of this diversity
of views. Only if the Sunday ordinance also involves an additional fac-
tor better left to state control, such as selling liquor, is an inconsistency
found.68
Gambling and prostitution. It might be thought that analogously
with the Sunday observance cases the court would treat with similar
liberality local regulation of other matters affecting the public morals
and decency. However, ordinances relating to gambling 0 and houses
"' Town of Ahoskie v. Moye, 200 N. C. 11, 156 S. E. 130 (1930) ; Lawrence v.
Nissen, 173 N. C. 359, 91 S. E. 1036 (1917); accord, Ex parte Lacey, 108 Cal.
362, 41 Pac. 411 (1895); see Shuford v. Town of Waynesville, 214 N. C. 135,
198 S. E. 585 (1938).
0" State v. Moore, 166 N. C. 371, 81 S. E. 693 (1914) ; State v. Sherrard, 117
N. C. 717, 23 S. E. 157 (1895); State v. Debnam, 98 N. C. 712, 3 S. E. 742
(1887) ; State v. Cainan, 94 N. C. 880 (1886). But cf. State v. Home, 115 N. C.
739, 20 S. E. 443 (1894).
"' State v. McNinch, 87 N. C. 567 (1882).
", Cases collected in note, 29 A. L. R. 397, 409 (1924).
"5 State v. Ray, 131 N. C. 814, 42 S. E. 960 (1902) ; cf. State v. Thomas, 118
N. C. 1221, 24 S. E. 535 (1896)." State v. Burbage, 172 N. C. 876, 89 S. E. 795 (1916).
.7 170 N. C. 682, 86 S. E. 597 (1915).
"State v. Langston, 88 N. C. 692 (1883).
"State v. McCoy, 116 N. C. 1059, 21 S. E. 690 (1895).
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of prostitution" have been held void as unauthorized or not in harmony
with the state law. Perhaps it is felt that there is no room for a reason-
able difference of opinion on such matters in different localities.
Intoxicating liquor. As has already been indicated 7' the sale of
liquor is a field said to have been preempted by the state. The cases are
practically unanimous in holding municipal regulation on the subject
unauthorized by N. C. GEN. STAT. §160-52 (1943) .72 The lone dis-
senting voice is that of Mr. justice Burwell speaking for the majority of
the court in the Austin case. In a well reasoned opinion he resisted
the "common right" and "preempt" arguments and looked to the pur-
pose of the statute to prevent the sale of liquor to minors. The ordi-
nance in the case was upheld as not inconsistent with but further
effectuating this purpose by forbidding such minors to enter barrooms
and thus preventing exposure to temptation.
73
Motor vehicles.74 In this field there is a lack of uniformity in the
decisions throughout the country.75 The North Carolina position, how-
ever, is clearly opposed to local regulation.7" The court is not inclined
to state any reason for its holdings except that an ordinance must yield
to the state law. It may be that due to the mobility and great number
of automobiles, our court feels that control should be centralized and
uniform and not subject to local variations. It would seem, however,
that in the matter of speed and traffic regulations, at least, different local
situations would render uniform legislation unsatisfactory. The fact
that the legislature has provided certain limitations on speed and traffic
for the good of the state as a whole should "not prevent further restric-
tions by the city if the same are reasonable and are made necessary by
special conditions and circumstances that are plainly not considered by
7" State v. Webber, 107 N. C. 962, 12 S. E. 598 (1890) ; see State v. Black, 150
N. C. 866, 867, 64 S. E. 778 (1909).
1 See note 41 supra.
2 State v. Dannenberg, 150 N. C. 799, 63 S. E. 946 (1909) ; State v." Thomas,
118 N. C. 1221, 24 S. E. 535 (1896); State v. Brittain, 89 N. C. 524 (1883);
State v. Langston, 88 N. C. 692 (1883). But cf. State v. Stevens, 114 N. C. 873,
19 S. E. 861 (1894) (under express authority to tax the retailing of liquor a city
may punish selling without a city license, the ordinance providing that if the sale
be without a state license also, the seller be bound over to the Superior Court).
"2Cf. Ex parte Boswell, 86 Cal. 232, 233, 24 Pac. 1060 (1890): "It may be
said that one cannot well bet at a gambling game unless he is a visitor thereat."
" Cases collected in notes, 147 A. L. R. 522 (1943), 64 A. L. R. 993 (1929)
and 21 A. L. R_ 1186 (1922).
7 3 McQmuILIN, op. cit. supra §924, n. 27.
70 State v. Sasseen, 206 N. C. 644, 175 S. E. 142 (1934) (requiring taxi cab
companies to file indemnity bonds with the city) ; State v. Gulledge, 208 N. C.
204, 179 S. E. 883 (1935). Contra: Willis v. City of Fort Smith, 121 Ark. 606,
182 S. W. 275 (1916); City of Dallas v. Gill (Tex. Civ. App.), 199 S. W. 1144
(1918); Ex parte Dicky, 76 W. Va. 576, 85 S. E. 781 (1915). See notes, 13
N. C. L. REV. 222 (1935) and 14 N. C. L. Rav. 104 (1935) criticizing Sasseen and
Gulledge cases, respectively.
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the legislature." 77 On the contrary it seems that additional local regu-
lation is necessary in order to afford equal protection to the people of
congested areas. As said by Mr. justice Cardozo in reversing a
lower New York court which had held a local speed regulation invalid
as in conflict with the state law: "We think the power of the local
authorities has been too narrowly construed. A speed that is safe in
the open country may be dangerous in cities and villages. The purpose
of the Legislature, in its delegation of the ordinance power was not to
relax in such localities the rules of the road. It was to make them more
rigid. We should be slow to construe the statute as making excessive
speed a misdemeanor in districts where the danger is slight, and in
denying it a like quality where the danger is great. Its language does
not force us to a construction so unreasonable."78
Such considerations will not prevail in North Carolina, however;
nor are they even discussed in the opinions. In State v. Stallings"0 the
statute required everyone to reduce his speed to not more than ten miles
per hour when approaching any intersection. An ordinance requiring
automobiles to be stopped completely before entering certain named
streets was held void as depriving operators of their right to cross all
intersections at ten miles per hour. It seems likely, however, that the
legislature was probably less concerned with creating such a right than
with preventing accidents at street intersections.8 " The ordinance was
designed to achieve this same purpose by requiring more care at par-
ticular danger spots. Again in State v. Freshwater1 an ordinance
purporting to reduce the speed of motor vehicles below the maximum
fixed by the general assembly was tersely dismissed as "plainly in con-
flict" with the statute. But the two regulations were not necessarily
inconsistent in either language or policy. The statute merely provided
that a speed in excess of ten miles per hour anywhere in the business
portion of a city should be deemed a violation ;82 the ordinance further
reduced the permissible speed within designated "fire limits." The re-
verse situation has been considered in some states and an ordinance
upheld which establishes a higher maximum speed limit than that pro-
vided by statute.8 3 There seems to be no North Carolina case in point,
but there is no reason to believe that our court would view this situation
in any more favorable light.
Christensen v. Tate, 87 Neb. 848, 853, 128 N. W. 622, 624 (1910).
Chapman v. Selover, 225 N. Y. 417, 420, 122 N. E. 206 (1919).
189 N. C. 104, 126 S. E. 187 (1924). Contra: Lamar & Smith v. Stroud
(Tex. Civ. App.), 5 S. W. 2d 824 (1928); cf. Mann v. Scott, 180 Cal. 550, 182
Pac. 281 (1919)." But see Schneiderman v. Sesanstein, 121 Ohio St. 80, 86, 167 N. E. 158, 160
(1929),
1183 N. C. 762, 111 S. E. 161 (1922). 82N. C. C. S. §2618 (1922).
"'Ex parte Snowden, 12 Cal. App. 521, 107 Pac. 724 (1910).
[Vol. 27
NOTES AND COMMENTS
North Carolina's strict attitude toward municipal regulation of auto-
mobiles has been embodied in the Motor Vehicle Act as N. C. GEN.
STAT. §20-19 (1943) : "Local authorities, except as expressly authorized
. . . shall have no power or authority to alter any speed limitations
declared in this article or to enact or enforce any rule or regulations
contrary to the provisions of this article."8 4 This statute and its prede-
cessors in content may, indeed, account for the position taken by the
Supreme Court. However, the court in the Freshwater case construed a
former statute (N. C. C. S. §2601 (1922)) prohibiting ordinances con-
trary to the provisions of the chapter on motor vehicles, and said that
the same result would follow without regard to the statutory inhibition.
. Summary and conclusion. Ordinances are not permitted either to
contradict or duplicate a state law in express terms. Where there is
room for the court to go either way on the question of inconsistency
the test should be the purpose behind the general law and how best to
achieve the most effective regulation. The North Carolina decisions for
the most part seem to give effect to this practical side of the problem.
In the written opinions, however, the main issue is too often obscured
by talk about "preempting the field," "lack of authority," and "conflict."
JAMES T. PRITCHETT, JR.
Railroads-Right-of-Way-Statutory Limitation Barring
Recovery Therefor
In a recent North Carolina case,' the plaintiff railroad sought an
injunction to require defendant to allow additional tracks to be built
parallel to and within fifty feet of the original track. The charter of
the railroad gave it the right to take land of "not more than one hun-
dred feet from the center of tlae road' 2 by condemnation proceedings,
and in 1884 the railroad had entered and laid its track on the original
roadbed without bringing condemnation proceedings and without any
conveyance from the owner. The defendant, or his predecessors in
title, has been in possession of the land adjoining the roadbed ever since
it was built and is the owner of the fee. In this case no action for
compensation has ever been brought against the railroad. N. C. GEN.
STAT. §1-51(1) bars any suit against a railroad for compensation for
land taken unless brought within five years after the land has been
"See City of Fremont v. Keating, 96 Ohio St. 468, 118 N. E. 114 (1917)
holding a similar statute unconstitutional as violating OHIo CoNsT. Art. XVIII
§3 giving municipalities authority to adopt police regulations not in conflict with
the general laws.
'Carolina & N. W. Ry. v. Piedmont Wagon & Mfg. Co., 229 N. C. 695, 51
S. E. 2d 301 (1949).IN. C. Pub. Laws 1871-2, c. 130, §7.
1949]
